We examined how expectation influences perception of complex objects. Participants discriminated between normal and distorted images of famous faces or places. Word cues (mostly valid) indicated either the general category or the exact identity of the upcoming image pair. Whereas category cues did not affect performance, valid exemplar expectation led to performance benefits. Furthermore, discrimination was slower after exemplar cues from the incorrect category than after invalid exemplar cues from the correct category, indicating costs of invalid category expectation. Thus, expectation of a specific exemplar facilitates perception of that object, but hinders perception of an object from a different category.
Introduction
As we interact with the world around us, we form expectations regarding stimuli we are likely to encounter. How do such expectations influence our perception? It is known that attention to particular locations facilitates target detection within those locations (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980) . Similarly, expectation of simple visual attributes (e.g., color, direction of motion) results in more efficient processing of subsequent stimuli containing those attributes (e.g., Ball & Sekuler, 1981; Corbetta, Miezen, & Dobmeyer, 1990) . These behavioral changes are accompanied by increases in neural activity in cortical areas that are specialized for processing the expected attributes (see Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000 for a review). However, such effects are typically observed for highly simplified stimulus displays (e.g., arrays of moving dots). In contrast, our aim was to determine whether and how expectation facilitates perception of real-world stimuli. Here we examined effects of expectation of categories, and of specific exemplars, on discrimination of complex objects.
Few studies have examined the effects of category or exemplar expectation on object perception; those that have leave several issues unresolved. For example, Reinitz, Wright, and Loftus (1989) cued participants to the category of upcoming objects and scenes, testing recognition memory after a delay. They found enhanced recognition for validly cued stimuli; however, without an immediate measure of perceptual performance, it is unclear whether expectation facilitated perception, rather than post-perceptual (e.g., semantic or memory-related) processes. More recently, Faulkner, Rhodes, Palermo, Pellicano, and Ferguson (2002) reported a reaction time (RT) benefit for discrimination between normal and distorted versions of famous faces after cueing with the correct vs. incorrect name, suggesting that expectation of a specific exemplar facilitates face perception. However, participants knew the validity of the cue on each trial, confounding effects of exemplar expectation with increased alertness on valid trials. Moreover, given the hypothesis that face perception is ''special'' (Farah, 1996) , it is unclear whether these findings generalize to other classes of complex visual objects. Furthermore, whereas these studies emphasized facilitatory effects, the possibility of a negative influence of expectation has not yet been suitably addressed.
0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2007.11. 017 Our goal was to determine whether and how expectation of specific exemplars and general object categories influences perceptual processing of faces and other objects. The task required discrimination between normal and distorted versions of famous faces (as in Faulkner et al., 2002) or places. We manipulated both exemplar and category expectation by cueing with specific names (exemplar cues), the words ''FACE'' and ''PLACE'' (category cues), or rows of Xs (neutral cues). We chose famous landmarks (or ''places'') as our second category of complex stimuli, based on recent evidence for a cortical area specialized for processing such stimuli (i.e., the parahippocampal place area, or PPA, e.g., Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) . By including two object categories, we were able to test whether expectation effects generalize across different classes of stimuli, and more important, whether invalid category expectation interferes with object processing. Further, unlike Faulkner et al. who informed participants of each cue's validity prior to target onset, we eliminated this alertness confound such that cue validity became evident only after target presentation, a strategy common in spatial attention studies (Posner et al., 1980 ).
Our results demonstrate two different effects of exemplar and category expectation on perception of complex stimuli. Specifically, expectation of the correct exemplar led to facilitation, whereas expectation of an exemplar from a different category hindered discrimination performance.
Experiment 1
Here we sought to determine (1) whether knowing just the category of an upcoming object can influence the efficiency of visual processing and (2) whether expectation of the exact exemplar (relative to an incorrect exemplar) truly benefits performance. Thus, we manipulated expectation of not only the exact identity of each target, but also its category. Importantly, our cueing strategy ensured that participants were not simply more alert on valid trials. On each trial, a name cue was followed by one normal and one distorted image of a famous face or place, presented side-byside. Participants indicated the location of the distorted image (Fig. 1) .
In the valid exemplar-valid category (VE-VC) condition (75% of trials; 480 out of 640 total trials), the cue predicted the exact identity of the upcoming target; e.g., the cue ''GOLDIE HAWN'' followed by a pair of images of Goldie Hawn. The invalid exemplar-valid category (IE-VC) condition (12.5% of trials; 80 out of 640) correctly cued the target's category, but not its identity; e.g., ''TOM HANKS'' followed by images of Goldie Hawn. Better performance in the VE-VC vs. IE-VC condition would indicate an advantage of valid exemplar expectation. The invalid exemplar-invalid category (IE-IC) condition (12.5% of trials) involved expectation of an exemplar from an entirely different category of objects; e.g., ''TAJ MAHAL'' followed by Goldie Hawn. This third condition was critical for assessing effects of category expectation: if category information does influence processing of subsequent stimuli, responses should be slower for IE-IC relative to IE-VC trials. Note that such an effect cannot be a non-specific effect of invalidity, unexpectedness in general, or a simple cue-target mismatch, as both IE-VC and IE-IC contain mismatches, unexpectedness, and are invalid with respect to identity. Thus, it would necessarily be due to the unique category invalidity in the IE-IC condition.
Methods

Participants
Thirty-seven volunteers participated in Experiment 1. Three of these did not achieve 60% accuracy on one or both stimulus categories; their data were excluded from further analysis. Participants in all experiments were UC Davis undergraduate and graduate students, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave written informed consent. Fig. 1 . Design and procedure for Experiment 1. Target images were faces on half of the trials and places on the other half. On the majority of trials, the cue was the correct name of the upcoming images (VE-VC condition). The remaining trials were evenly divided between the invalid exemplar-valid category (IE-VC) and the invalid exemplar-invalid category (IE-IC) conditions. On each trial, participants pressed a key indicating whether the distorted image appeared on the right or on the left.
Stimuli and procedure
Cues were names of famous people or places, presented in capital letters (e.g., ''GOLDIE HAWN'' or ''TAJ MAHAL''). Target images were a pair of grayscale photographs of the same person or place, one normal and one distorted, presented simultaneously on either side of a central fixation point against a gray background, each subtending approximately 4°· 5°. The stimulus set contained two distorted and one normal version for each of 20 faces and 20 places. Face images were a subset of those used by Faulkner et al. (2002) , in which distortions involved positioning the mouth and eyes either closer to or farther from the nose. Distorted place images contained a region originating near the center (varying somewhat in size depending on the landmark's architecture, but on average including approximately one-third of the structure) that was skewed to the right or left. All distortions were created in Adobe Photoshop 6.0.
Trials began with a red fixation point (500 ms), followed by the cue (250 ms), a 1500 ms delay, and then the target image pair (250 ms). Cue and target durations were the same as those reported in Faulkner et al. (2002) , whereas the delay period was increased (from 250 ms) to maximize the time available for cue processing and target expectation without allowing the overall length of the experiment to exceed approximately one hour. Participants indicated whether the distorted image was on the right or left by pressing a key, and were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Auditory feedback followed the response, and the next trial began after a 1000 ms delay during which the fixation point was black.
Participants were aware that the majority of trials contained valid cues (e.g., the cue ''GOLDIE HAWN'' followed by images of Goldie Hawn). Trials were counterbalanced such that all stimuli appeared with equal frequency within each condition, and equally often on the right and left. Trial orders were pseudorandomized with respect to validity condition, stimulus category and response (right/left), producing an unpredictable but balanced distribution of conditions and responses across the experiment. In this way, although each pair of normal and distorted images appeared eight times over the course of the entire experiment; six times in the VE-VC condition (only three times in a given right/left configuration) and once in the IE-VC and IE-IC conditions, any impact on performance due to repetition of specific image pairs would apply equally across validity conditions.
Prior to the experiment, participants viewed the normal version of each stimulus, reported whether they recognized it (either by naming or providing information related to the person or place), and were subsequently shown the name. Across all experiments, participants on average recognized 80% of the faces and 70% of the places upon initial viewing. Participants recognizing fewer than 75% within either category were shown the stimuli from that category again until they were able to name at least 75% of them (maximum of two additional presentations). Each participant completed 40 practice trials, followed by 640 experimental trials, with brief breaks every 80 trials. The experiment was performed using Presentation Ò software (Versions 0.60-9.9, www.neuro-bs.com).
Data analysis
For all experiments, mean reaction times (RTs) on correct trials and accuracy were analyzed with repeated measures ANOVAs; two-tailed t-tests were used for planned pairwise comparisons. Trials with RTs < 250 ms or >3 s were excluded from analysis (on average .3% of trials).
Results and discussion
Reaction time and accuracy data were entered into 2 · 3 ANOVAs, with stimulus category (faces/places) and validity (VE-VC/IE-VC/IE-IC) as factors (Fig. 2) . A main effect of stimulus category (faster RTs for places than faces; F(1, 33) = 143.85, p < .0001) was due to the place distortions being somewhat less subtle than the face distortions. A main effect of validity (F(2, 66) = 32.75, p < .0001) reflected longer RTs for IE-VC than VE-VC, t(33) = 4.60, p < .0001, and longer RTs for IE-IC than IE-VC, t(33) = 4.37, p < .0005 (IE-IC > VE-VC, t(33) = 6.85, p < .0001). Stimulus category did not interact significantly with validity, F(2, 66) = 2.45, p = .09.
Slower discrimination in the IE-IC condition (''TAJ MAHAL'' to Goldie Hawn) than in the IE-VC condition (''TOM HANKS'' to Goldie Hawn) demonstrates that incorrect category information interferes significantly with object processing. Importantly, this performance cost cannot be due to the presence of invalid information per se, because both conditions contain invalid exemplar information. Instead, the RT difference reflects a cost of the violation of category expectation that is above and beyond the cost of invalid exemplar expectation. Further analysis showed that this effect is significant for both stimulus categories: t(33) = 2.28, p < .03 for faces; t(33) = 3.23, p < .005 for places.
Participants were faster when cued with the correct name (VE-VC), than with a different name from within the same category (IE-VC), confirming the benefit of valid exemplar cueing on face discrimination reported by Faulkner et al. (2002) . In contrast to that study, however, here there is no possibility of an alertness confound. Furthermore, our results also show this benefit for places, demonstrating that the facilitatory influence of exemplar expectation on perception of complex stimuli is not limited to faces (t(33) = À3.85, p < .0005 for faces; t(33) = À3.37, p < .001 for places).
Although our experiments emphasized RTs, we analyzed accuracy to verify that the observed RT effects were not due to speed/accuracy trade-offs. Mean accuracy for face discrimination (77.7%) was similar to that reported by Faulkner et al. (2002) (79.9%), whereas accuracy for places was near ceiling (95.6%), again reflecting the relative ease of discriminating the place distortions (main effect of stimulus category, F(33, 1) = 133.85, p < .0001). A main effect of validity, F(2, 66) = 7.47, p < .005, reflected higher accuracy for VE-VC than IE-VC, t(33) = 2.59, p < .02, with no significant difference between IE-VC and IE-IC, t(33) = 1.49, p = .15. Validity interacted marginally with stimulus category, F(2, 66) = 3.02, p = .06, such that the simple effect of validity was significant for faces, F(2, 66) = 6.22, p < .005, but not places, F(2, 66) < 1. Thus, all significant effects were consistent with the RT analysis, with no evidence of speed/accuracy trade-offs. In summary, Experiment 1 produced two results: first, expectation of the incorrect category leads to slower discrimination relative to expectation of the correct category. Hence, prior category knowledge has an effect over and above any effect of knowing an exemplar within the category.
Second, we confirm that exemplar expectation results in a processing advantage for an expected vs. unexpected face even when there is no alertness confound, and we extend this finding to another stimulus category (places). However, it is not clear whether this advantage is truly a benefit of valid exemplar expectation, or is due to a cost generated by the invalidity in the IE-VC condition (''TOM HANKS'' to Goldie Hawn). This is an important distinction: the latter would suggest only category benefits (with the RT difference resulting simply from a breach of expectation in the IE-VC condition), rather than exemplar benefits. This issue is addressed Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
To determine if valid exemplar expectation results in a benefit beyond any effect of category expectation, we replaced the IE-VC condition with a condition that provides valid category information, but contains no invalidity. In this new valid category (VC) condition, cues consisted of the words ''FACE'' or ''PLACE'', and thus contained no exemplar information. To maximize category expectation, these cues were always valid. Under these conditions, an advantage for VE-VC vs. VC trials must be entirely attributed to a benefit of exemplar expectation, rather than an effect of valid category information, or interference due to invalidity.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers participated in Experiment 2. Two did not achieve 60% accuracy on one or both stimulus categories, and two others recognized very few of the stimuli (< 25%); the data from these four participants were excluded from further analysis.
Stimuli and procedure
Cues in the VC condition were the words ''FACE'' and ''PLACE''. Participants were informed that the majority of exemplar cues would be valid, and also that the pure category cues were always valid (e.g., ''FACE'' would always be followed by face images). All else remained identical to Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
A repeated measures ANOVA on correct RTs, with stimulus category and validity as factors, again showed main effects of stimulus category, F(1, 23) = 105.72, p < .0001, and validity, F(2, 46) = 20.85, p < .0001. Stimulus category interacted with validity, F(2, 46) = 4.11, p < .03, due to a greater difference between VE-VC and VC conditions for faces than places, F(1, 23) = 4.72, 1 For all experiments, analyses reported here include the subset of trials containing stimuli with which a given participant may initially have been unfamiliar, primarily to ensure a sufficient number of trials for all conditions after exclusion of incorrect trials in the RT analysis. Results of additional ANOVAs, in which trials containing these unfamiliar stimuli (and/or cues) were excluded, were consistent with our original results for both RTs and accuracy across all experiments. Results of planned t-tests were also replicated despite reduced statistical power (due to the low number of trials remaining in the invalid and neutral conditions), with the exception of the RT difference between the IE-VC and IE-IC conditions for faces in Experiment 1, which remained in the same direction but did not reach significance. p < .05 (Fig. 3) . Participants were slower in IE-IC than VC, t(23) = 2.79, p < .02 for faces, t(23) = 3.83, p < .001 for places, consistent with the category effect observed in Experiment 1. Crucial to our question, participants were faster in VE-VC than VC (t(23) = À3.42, p < .005 for faces, t(23) = À2.66, p < .02 for places), demonstrating a true benefit due to expectation of the correct exemplar. Thus, expectation of the exact identity of an upcoming target provides an advantage beyond any potential benefit conferred by prior knowledge of the category to which it belongs.
Main effects of stimulus category, F(1, 23) = 82.25, p < .0001, and validity, F(2, 46) = 3.91, p < .03, were also observed for accuracy. An interaction, F(2, 46) = 3.34, p < .05, was due to a decrease in accuracy from VE-VC to VC for faces, t(23) = 2.26, p < .04, but an increase from VE-VC to VC for places, t(23) = À2.86, p < .01. Thus, the advantage for faces in both RTs and accuracy indicates a genuine exemplar cueing benefit; the similar RT effect for places also suggests a true benefit (although for places we cannot rule out a potential speed/accuracy trade-off).
Having established that expecting the exact exemplar results in a true benefit for discrimination performance, we now return to the category expectation effect. In Experiment 1 we showed that expecting the wrong object increases RTs even more when it belongs to an unexpected category. A question that still remains is whether this difference reflects a benefit of expectation of the correct category, as opposed to a cost incurred by expectation of the incorrect category. Moreover, in the preceding experiments, the invalid category condition contained both invalid category and invalid exemplar information (e.g., ''TAJ MAHAL'' cues Goldie Hawn); thus it is not clear how invalid category information alone affects performance. Experiment 3 addresses these questions with a modified design.
Experiment 3
To determine whether pure category expectation enhances and/or impedes discrimination performance, we included both valid and invalid general category cues (unlike in Experiment 2, where ''FACE'' and ''PLACE'' were always valid cues), as well as neutral cues. Here, in the invalid category condition, category invalidity was not combined with exemplar invalidity, thereby isolating the influence of category information. The addition of neutral trials provided a baseline, allowing assessment of costs and benefits. We similarly manipulated exemplar cue validity, in order to compare the effects of exemplar expectation and pure category expectation within a single experiment.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-five volunteers participated in Experiment 3. Data from one participant, whose reaction times were longer than 3 s on more than 10% of trials, were excluded.
Stimuli and procedure
Here trials were valid (60%), neutral (20%) or invalid (20%). The cues indicated either an exemplar or general category. This yielded a 3 · 2 · 2 design with validity, cue type (exemplar/category), and stimulus category (faces/ places) as factors (Fig. 4) . Two neutral cues were used, ''XXXXX XXXXX'' and ''XXXXX'', approximating the average length of exemplar and category cues, respectively.
To bring overall performance on faces and places closer together, we reduced the set of faces and places to 16 each, eliminating several for which the discrimination was particularly difficult, or which many participants could not identify upon initial viewing. Also, the place distortions were made more subtle by using the ''pinch'' and ''spherize'' functions in Adobe Photoshop (instead of skewing as in preceding experiments). These changes reduced overall differences in RTs and accuracy between face and place trials (see Section 4.2).
The new design along with the modified number of stimuli resulted in 192 trials in each of the two valid conditions (valid exemplar-valid category, or VE-VC, and valid category, or VC), and 64 trials in each neutral (neutral exemplar, or NE, and neutral category, or NC) and invalid (invalid exemplar-invalid category, or IE-IC, and invalid category, or IC) condition (half faces and half places in each condition). As before, stimuli and responses were counterbalanced, conditions interleaved, and trial orders pseudorandomized.
Participants again were informed that the majority of cues would be valid, and also that neutral cues were nonpredictive. The timing and procedure remained the same as in Experiments 1 and 2; each participant first viewed the normal versions of the stimuli, performed a short practice session, and then completed 640 experimental trials with brief breaks every 80 trials.
Results and discussion
A 3 · 2 · 2 repeated measures ANOVA on correct RTs revealed a main effect of validity, F(2, 46) = 22.74, p < .0001, no effect of cue type, F(1, 23) < 1, and a main effect of stimulus category, F(1, 23) = 83.90, p < .0001 (Fig. 5) . This last effect showed faster RTs for places than faces (685 ms vs. 748 ms), although this difference was now much reduced due to our stimulus modifications. The 3-way interaction between validity, cue type, and stimulus category was significant, F(2, 46) = 5.71, p < .01, due to exemplar cues producing a significant validity effect, F(2, 46) = 31.32, p < .0001, with a further interaction of validity by stimulus category, F(2, 46) = 5.37, p < .01. The latter indicated costs (IE-IC vs. NE) for both faces and places, t(23) = 4.29, p < .0005, t(23) = 3.27, p < .005, respectively, but a benefit (VE-VC vs. NE) only for faces, t(23) = À2.88, p < .01, not places, t(23) = .72, p = .5. In contrast, category cues showed no effect of validity, F(2, 46) = 1.42, p = .25, and no validity by stimulus category interaction, F(2, 46) = 1.36, p = .27.
For accuracy, only the effect of stimulus category approached significance, F(1, 23) = 4.0, p = .06, with higher accuracy for places than faces (87.5% vs. 84.5%). A trend toward lower accuracy after invalid cues (86.5%, 86.3% for valid and neutral, respectively, vs. 85.0% for invalid) produced a marginal effect of validity, F(2, 46) = 2.91, p = .07.
These results clearly demonstrate both benefits of valid exemplar expectation, particularly for faces, and costs of invalid category expectation, but only following exemplar cues. The apparent lack of a significant exemplar benefit for places (neutral vs. valid) we believe was due to an anomaly in the neutral condition (see Jonides & Mack, 1984) , as is evident from the large RT difference in the means of the two neutral conditions for places (Fig. 5, left  panel) . Indeed, when we tested for a difference between VE-VC (''TAJ MAHAL'' to Taj Mahal) and VC (''PLACE'' to Taj Mahal) trials (an equally appropriate comparison for detecting exemplar benefits) a significant effect was present (t(23) = À2.43, p < .03), although smaller in magnitude than for faces. Thus, exemplar cueing benefits are present for both faces and places; the magnitude difference may be related to participants having less initial familiarity with the place stimuli (70% recognition for places vs. 83% for faces).
Because only exemplar expectation produced significant effects on performance, we conducted an additional experiment in which we provided only category cues. We reasoned that in Experiment 3, perhaps participants ignored the category cues, given that exemplar cues provide more information overall. We thus repeated the experiment but with exemplar cues removed, thereby encouraging participants to rely on the category cues. However, even when all cues were at the category level, no effect of validity Fig. 4 . Design and procedure for Experiment 3. Target images were faces on half of the trials and places on the other half. Cues could be the name of a famous person or place (exemplar cue), the general category ''FACE'' or ''PLACE'' (category cue), or a row of Xs (neutral cue). The majority of cues were valid, while the rest were evenly divided between neutral and invalid. Participants indicated whether the distorted image appeared on the right or left.
was observed (F(2, 46) < 1), confirming that for this task, performance costs and benefits occur only when exemplar information is provided.
2 Hence, it appears that the category effect observed in Experiments 1 and 2 depends entirely on the cost generated by the expectation of an exemplar from the wrong category.
General discussion
This series of experiments shows that exemplar expectation influences the efficiency with which an upcoming face or place image is processed. Thus, expectation affects perceptual processing not only of simple stimulus features, but also of complex, real-world stimuli. Although a previous study (Faulkner et al., 2002) reported an influence of exemplar cueing on face perception, here we establish that it is exemplar expectation itself (as opposed to non-specific arousal) that enhances discrimination of valid targets. Moreover, whereas functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have revealed that activity in extrastriate areas specialized for face processing is modulated by attention and imagery, and therefore cannot be exclusively automatic and stimulus-driven (O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998) , our results demonstrate that perception of faces can be facilitated over and above any inherent advantage faces may possess as potent biological stimuli, as this facilitation occurs even in the absence of competing stimuli. Finally, as shown in Experiment 1, whereas expectation of the correct exemplar produces a benefit, expectation of an exemplar from the incorrect category results in a cost. Notably, despite suggestions that face processing relies on a unique, independent resource that suffers only from face-specific capacity limits (Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2003) , here both face and place processing suffer from costs due to invalid category expectation.
Generally, our findings are consistent with previous reports of the influence of expectation on perception of low-level stimulus attributes, and interactions of imagery with perception of simple stimuli (Farah, 1985; Ishai & Sagi, 1997) . However, in addition to demonstrating that expectation affects perception of more complex, realistic stimuli, our study also provides a novel dissociation between facilitation due to expectation of the exact exemplar, and interference induced by expectation of an exemplar from a different category. Hence, although cueing an exact representation (''activating'' the most relevant neural population) boosts subsequent stimulus processing (exemplar benefit), activation of an overlapping population representing a different exemplar from the same category proves to be less costly (assuming some shared features) than activation of a population associated with a perceptually distinct category of stimuli (presumably with little feature overlap).
It is important to note that the interference caused by expectation of the inappropriate category depended entirely on expectation of a specific exemplar; a striking result of Experiment 3 is that prior knowledge of the category alone had no detectable influence on performance. Based on traditional theories concerning stages of object recognition and categorization (Biederman, 1987; Rosch, 1978) , as well as recent data demonstrating that participants discern an object's category more quickly than they identify it as a particular exemplar (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005) , we hypothesized that general category expectation might facilitate the categorization stage if target processing time is severely restricted. We tested this notion with an experiment identical to Experiment 3, except with reduced target duration (70 ms). Results exactly replicated Experiment 3 (although overall performance was lower), showing no effect of category cue validity (further target duration reductions were not feasible, as they resulted in near-chance performance). 2 To test whether these category cues can be used at all, we conducted an experiment identical to Experiment 3, except requiring a much coarser discrimination (upright vs. inverted). Here, both exemplar and category cue validity significantly affected RTs (both ps < .005; though exemplar effects were greater: cue type · validity interaction, p < .0005). Although with such a gross discrimination the level at which cues influenced performance is unclear (e.g., features vs. objects), this nonetheless confirms that pure category cues can generate expectation effects.
Given recent experiments supporting the hypothesis that object category information in the form of low spatial frequencies is rapidly projected to prefrontal regions and provides top-down constraints on feed-forward object recognition processes (Bar et al., 2006) , it is somewhat surprising that general category foreknowledge does not appear to influence perception in our study. On the other hand, exemplar cues may have the unique effect of advancing the system beyond the categorization stage via feedback pathways prior to stimulus onset, providing a substantial ''head-start'' for processing expected objects, but effectively a ''false-start'' when stimuli are from the unexpected category. However, it is still possible that category cues would influence performance when a task requires discrimination at the level of object categories rather than exemplars (or subexemplars, as in our task).
Our finding that exemplar expectation produces benefits and costs, whereas category expectation alone produces neither, may provide insight regarding recent fMRI studies that appeared to produce inconsistent results. Some reported increased activity in ventral object-processing areas during expectation (prior to stimulus appearance), whereas others did not. The resolution may depend in part on the nature of the expected stimuli: specific exemplars vs. more general categories. Thus, increases in activity in object-selective areas such as the FFA (fusiform face area; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and PPA during object expectation occurred when participants generated representations of specific exemplars from the region's preferred category (Lepsien & Nobre, 2007; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Pinsk, Kastner, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2000; Ranganath, Cohen, Dam, & D'Esposito, 2004) ; in contrast, when category information alone (e.g., faces in general) was sufficient for performing the task, expectation-related modulations in these regions were weaker and less reliable (Corbetta et al., 2005; Puri, Hansen, Buonocore, & Wojciulik, 2003) . Consistent with this observation, recent data suggest that more specific cues (e.g., ''Penn bookstore'' vs. ''classroom'') generate greater anticipatory activity in PPA (Epstein & Higgins, 2007) . Thus, expectation may optimally engage category-selective visual areas when based on a specific exemplar from the preferred category. Indeed, it is plausible that such preparatory activity reflects an important component of the neural basis for the expectation-induced facilitation and interference reported here.
